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1. Overview - CCAFS West Africa scenarios workshop 2, 2-4 Sept, hôtel Pullman 
Teranga, Dakar  
From 2 to 4 November 2011 the second CCAFS scenarios development workshop was held 
at the hôtel Pullman Teranga in Dakar. The workshop focused on developing plausible 
alternate narratives of the future of West Africa in terms of socio-economic and political 
change and the effects of these futures on food security, environments and livelihoods.  
 
Organized by CCAFS and hosted by CORAF, around 40 participants from CCAFS countries 
in West Africa - Ghana, Sénégal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger- actively participated in the 
workshop. The Gambia was also represented on behalf of regional farmers‟ organization 
ROPPA. ECOWAS was represented through the principal programme officer for the 
Agriculture Productivity Programme. Other regional institutions included the FARA 
programme from Ghana, ACMAD in Niger and ICRISAT in Mali.  
 
Participants came from policy and government, research, NGOs and CSOs, media and the 
private sector. These participants were trained in a wide range of disciplines connected to 
socio-economic and political change, food systems, environments and livelihoods.   
 
The CCAFS team facilitators of workshop came from the Environmental Change Institute of 
the University of Oxford, ILRI and ICRAF in Nairobi and ICRISAT in Bamako. The 
workshop was highly successful and an ambitious set of objectives was achieved due  to the 
great, diverse, driven and skilled group of participants attending the workshop.  
 
This report provides a first overview of the content generated within the workshop, 
encompassed by presentations, discussions in plenary and in breakout groups per day.  
 
First, the next section introduces CCAFS and the CCAFS scenarios process.  
 
1.1 CCAFS context and scenarios strategy 
CCAFS objectives  
CCAFS: Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) is a major research 
partnership between the CGIAR and the global environmental change community (formerly 
ESSP).  Its objectives are:  
 
1. close critical gaps in the knowledge of how to enhance – and manage the trade-offs 
between – food security, livelihood and environmental goals in the face of a changing 
climate;  
 
2. develop and evaluate options for adapting to a changing climate to inform agricultural 
development, food security policy and donor investment strategies;  
 
3. enable and assist farmers, policymakers, researchers and donors to continually 
monitor, assess and adjust their actions in response to observed and anticipated 
changes in climate.  
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Its focus is on three initial regions, namely East Africa, West Africa and the Indo-Gangetic 
Plains. See figure 1 for a visual representation of the CCAFS framework.  
 
 
Figure 1. The CCAFS framework. 
 
1.2 CCAFS scenarios objectives 
 
Within the CCAFS programme, participatory scenarios are being developed and used for 
each region, as part of the themes “Linking knowledge with action” and “data and tools”. The 
objectives of the scenarios activity are:  
 
1. to evaluate key uncertainties for regional food security, environment and livelihoods 
under conditions of global environmental and socio-economic change as seen from a 
range of societal perspectives;  
 
2. to develop regional capacity for governance and decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty.  
 
In terms of these objectives, the development and use of the socio-economic scenarios 
functions as a platform for the exchange and application of knowledge and experience 
between (CCAFS) researchers and policy makers, private sectors, NGOs and other societal 
actors. Because scenarios allow for the capturing of uncertainties and systems complexity in a 
coherent and plausible yet surprising and challenging fashion, scenarios are also a tool for 
generating shared engagement.  
Adapting Agriculture to
Climate Variability and Change
Technologies, practices, partnerships 
and policies for:
1. Adaptation to Progressive 
Climate Change
2. Adaptation through Managing 
Climate Risk
3. Pro-poor Climate Change 
Mitigation
Improved 
Environmental 
Health Improved 
Rural 
Livelihoods Improved 
Food Security
Enhanced adaptive capacity
in agricultural, natural resource 
management, and food systems
4. Integration for Decision Making
• Linking Knowledge with Action
• Assembling Data and Tools for 
Analysis and Planning
• Refining Frameworks for Policy 
Analysis
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1.3 Why scenarios? 
 
The future of interacting food systems, environments and livelihoods is highly complex and 
uncertain, there are many different stakes at play and conditions change quickly. In this 
context, predictions are not viable. However, we still need to face this complexity and 
uncertainty without being pacified – scenarios are a communal, creative response to this 
challenge that draws on sharing of experiences and new insights between participants from 
across sectors and disciplines.  
 
Scenarios focus on capturing key future uncertainties in alternate, plausible „what-if” stories 
about the future, told through narratives, numbers, images and other formats. It should be 
emphasized that scenarios are not predictions, but instead explore multiple plausible futures 
without making a judgment about which future is more likely. Scenarios are instead tools to 
re-think and re-organize the presence under considerations of future uncertainty : 
 
• Scenarios help consider future uncertainties without getting lost in the multitude of 
possibilities 
• Scenarios present concrete stories that are able to bring together very different 
perspectives and types of information 
• Scenarios bring the future to life and make it imaginable 
• Scenarios help stretch preconceptions 
• Scenarios help think consistently about the future 
 
1.4 CCAFS regional scenarios process 
The CCAFS regional scenarios process follows several basic steps –see figure 2. These steps 
reflect the need for a distinction between exploratory socio-economic scenarios (focusing on 
what can happen) and normative scenarios/visions (focusing on what should happen) and the 
value that both exploratory scenarios and visions have to offer if used together. 
These steps are also based on the notion that the relevance of scenarios should be tested and 
improved by actually using them.   
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Figure 2. CCAFS scenarios strategy.  
1. Bring together stakeholders representing a wide range of regional perspectives, types of 
knowledge and experience to develop exploratory scenarios of the future.  
 
2. Once basic scenario narratives have been created, the CCAFS regional scenarios process 
focuses on improving the usefulness of the scenarios:  
 Increase consistency, credibility and relevance of the scenarios by creating 
relevant quantitative information through modelling and other quantification 
processes. This quantification work can produce counter-intuitive 
consequences of the scenarios that would require reconsideration of the 
narratives and lead to improved scenarios. Integrate quantitative and 
qualitative output.  
 Increase the visibility and usage of scenarios as a decision making tool among 
key audiences through collaboration with media, using news items, fictional 
narratives, images, radio, video, theatre, interactive visualization.  
3. Bring together stakeholders representing different regional needs, agendas and aspirations 
to create shared visions for the region‟s future. Visioning is engaging and goal-oriented – and 
very suitable for work with policy makers and private sector actors.  
Scenarios: what can happen Visioning: what should happen
Use 
scenarios to 
explore 
pathways to 
vision under 
uncertainty 
(4)
Feasible 
vision, 
robust 
policies and 
strategies (4)
Uncertain 
future
Scenarios
capture 
alternative
Futures (1)
Improve 
scenarios’
usefulness 
through
quantification 
and media (2)
Improve scenarios 
based on use (5)
Different 
perspectives: 
different types of 
knowledge, 
experience
Different 
perspectives: 
different 
needs, 
aspirations
Create 
shared 
vision for
regional
Future (3)
Dissemination of 
scenarios, visions, 
strategies to key users 
(6)
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4. Use the scenarios to explore how these visions could be realized in each of the alternative 
futures, what the major obstacles are and what policies and strategies would be effective 
across the scenarios. Integrating the testing of visions, policy choices and strategies within 
the scenarios process allows us to ensure the scenarios are used, and to test their usefulness.  
 
5. Improve the scenarios based on their use and experience in the visioning/strategy work.  
 
6. Disseminate the regional scenarios, vision, policy and strategy outcomes further to key 
audiences. We are employing media experts and dedicated regional networking consultants 
for this purpose.  
 
7. Developing local and global scenarios to make cross-level linkages. 
 
In another CCAFS region, East Africa, the scenarios development process was started first 
and is now nearly complete. In this region, CCAFS is organizing a wide range of different 
uses for the scenarios with key regional actors such as strategic visioning workshops with the 
East African Community and USAID and the CCAFS Regional Learning Platform, but also 
radio programs, tv items, newspaper articles and an interactive web tool to experiment with 
the key insights from the scenarios. Furthermore, links to local projects are made both within 
and outside CCAFS, using the scenarios to provide different socio-economic and policy 
conditions to experiment with the viability of different local strategies and technologies in 
terms of food security, environments and livelihoods. We are also planning to have the East 
African and later on West African scenarios inform the new IPCC socio-economic 
development pathways.  
For the CCAFS West Africa region, we are planning a similarly broad and diverse use of the 
scenarios that involves key regional actors and ensures that the scenarios are used to their 
maximum potential for the facilitation of uncertainty-conscious regional governance. 
2.Workshop day 1 
 
2.1 Official opening 
 
Dr. Mbène Dème Faye welcomed the participants on behalf of the Executive director of 
CORAF. After her, Mr Ernest Aubee made an introductory speech on behalf of ECOWAS 
Commission. Both speeches are annexed to this report. 
 
After welcome remarks, CCAFS scenarios team leader John Ingram (ECI Oxford) introduced 
the workshop, beginning with an introduction of the CCAFS team and particularly of the 
CCAFS regional leader, Dr. Robert Zougmore.  
 
2.2 Introduction and background 
 
Next, the objectives of the workshop and the overall programme were communicated by 
CCAFS scenarios officer, Dr. Joost Vervoort.  
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Introducing the CCAFS scenarios process, the facilitator highlighted the fact that exploratory 
scenarios are different from visions in that they do not focus on what the participants want to 
happen or want to avoid, but instead focus on what could happen irrespective of what is 
desired. 
 
2.3 Introduction of participants and expressions of expectations 
 
Participants then got the opportunity to introduce themselves and discuss their expectations 
for the workshop.  
 
It was made clear that participants came from very different backgrounds in terms of 
disciplines, sectors and countries of origin, and that together they brought great expertise.  
 
The following are some expectations that were uttered:  
 
 For the scenarios to be completed and more usable by researchers 
 Joint actions to come out of the work together 
 Find effective food security responses 
 Link concerns about environments and livelihoods to food security work 
 Learn about the scenarios development process  
 The hope that re results of the process will not be buried like the 2025 prospective 
vision elaborated by regional governments 
 For CCAFS to ensure the use of the scenarios once completed 
 Provide better regional scenarios as context for research 
 Scenarios as a bridge between community needs and research  
 Develop scenario development skills 
 Share and link experience between scenario developers and other researchers 
 
2.4 CCAFS program priority themes, previous steps in the process and examples 
 
John Ingram elaborated on CCAFS, its objectives (see previous section) and its priority 
themes (see figure 1). The role of the scenarios within these objectives was further discussed.  
 
Then, Robert Zougmore gave a presentation from his perspective as CCAFS regional leader 
on West Africa in terms of food security, environments and livelihoods and the CCAFS 
activities on these themes. Robert gave an overview of his region, discussing such issues as 
the degradation of 25% of lands creating poverty for millions of people, most of whom are 
smallholder farmers.  CCAFS aims to help regions respond to such issues and transition to 
sustainable and equitable food security, environmental management and livelihoods, taking 
environmental changes such as climate change as a main focus. This ambition entails many 
challenges but also opportunities. Current policies are ineffective. Scenarios can be a way to 
consider the future in order to re-organize the present in terms of policies across sectors.  
 
Dr. Polly Ericksen from ILRI, Nairobi described the first steps of the scenarios development 
process taken for CCAFS West Africa. In the previous workshop, key uncertainties were 
discussed and some first ideas for scenario storylines were developed. These ideas would 
form the basis for the work in the workshop discussed in this report, though this content was 
open for revision. This revised content will be part of the report in subsequent sections.  
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The CCAFS East Africa scenarios process was introduced by Joost Vervoort as an example 
of where the process can lead, and examples discussed under step 7 in the process description 
were used to give participants a practical idea of the many potential uses of the CCAFS 
scenarios.  
 
2.5 Workshop outline 
 
Figure 3 shows the different steps undertaken in the workshop. The first draft results of these 
steps will be presented in the subsequent sections of this document.  
 
  
 
Figure 3. Steps in the workshop 
 
2.6 Revision of key drivers 
 
We revisited the key drivers identified in the previous workshop – factors where the direction 
of change is highly relevant for future food security, environments and livelihoods in West 
Africa up to 2030. Of these, the drivers that were seen as both highly relevant and highly 
uncertain were used as “key uncertainties”. These are used to determine the differences 
between the scenarios.  
 
Population growth and climate change had been identified in the previous workshop as highly 
relevant but not as highly uncertain – since population growth can indeed be predicted from 
current births and climate change forecasts only start to differ widely after 2030. These 
drivers will therefore be assumed to be the same over all scenarios.  
 
The key uncertainties chosen by the participants of the previous workshop were “state actors 
leading” versus “private sector leading” and “focus on short-term agricultural production” 
versus “long term agricultural, environmental and social sustainability”. In discussing the 
revision of these key uncertainties, a long, lively and fruitful discussion ensued. 
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The group agreed on maintaining the basic uncertainties but rephrasing them to make them  
more useful and flexible. See figure 4 for these revised phrasings.  
 
The absence of regional integration in the key uncertainties was discussed, and  it was agreed 
that integration and interactions between regional and national policies should be part of all 
the narratives.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Key uncertainties revised.  
 
The vertical axis was changed to “state actors dominant force” versus “non-state actors 
dominant force” to give this axis more general applicability – many non-state actors fall 
outside the private sector label. Changing “leading” to “dominant force” provides some more 
room in each scenario for the opposite group of actors to still play a role in the scenario.  
 
The change of the horizontal axis of uncertainty to “short-term priorities” versus “long-term 
priorities” was initially a point for long discussion. What this axis means is that the dominant 
actors (whether mostly state or non-state actors) maintain short-term or long-term priorities. 
This applies throughout the time line – in 2028, actors will either have short-term priorities 
reaching to 2030 or focus on priorities that reach to 2050.  
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2.7 Scenario groups – headlines exercise  
 
Following the revision of the key uncertainties, the participants were divided into four 
groups, one for each scenario resulting from a combination of key uncertainties. These 
groups mixed disciplines, sectors and countries of origin.  
 
We used a headlines exercise: each member of the group was asked to describe developments 
or events that could take place in the given scenario. Participants were asked to frame these 
items as if they were writing news headlines. This way, the process focused on concrete, 
tangible events and developments which help make the scenario more real and defined. 
z 
In this phase, we were not yet looking to create a coherent storyline, but to capture as many 
ideas about the scenario as possible. Therefore, participants were asked to put ideas on post-
its individually without discussing them for the first 20 minutes. After this first round, 
discussions followed and out of these interactions more post-its were added.  
 
The product was an unstructured but rich assemblage of possible story elements for each 
scenario.  
 
Headlines exercise – results per scenario group 
 
SCENARIO 1: short-term priorities with state actors as the dominant force.                                  
 
Headline # 1: “GMOs are legal in most West African countries (2021)” 
States have taken a pro-active, interventionist stance to resolve the food security problem 
using easiest mechanisms available: global biotechnology and local legislative power. 
 
Headline # 2: “Rice imports from Asia hit an all-time high (anytime)” 
Food security targets require immediate procurement of staples with rice being cheaper on 
international markets, and local trade operators being a “quick and dirty” mechanism to meet 
the growing demand, particularly from growing urban areas. 
 
Headline # 3: “Dry land forests, a thing of the past (2030)” 
Rapid growth in food and fuel demand driven by population increase, particularly urban, call 
for rapid cropland expansion and fuel wood exploitation in Sudan and Guinean agro-
ecologies home to the last dry forests for West Africa. There is little incentive to preserve 
protected areas for the longer term and preference is given to agro-forestry, mixed, intensified 
systems. 
 
Headline # 4: “Irrigated cropland has doubled in 20 years (2030)” 
West Africa harbors abundant water reserves both on surface and underground, largely 
untapped, and returns on investments are highest in irrigated agriculture in the short term. 
States can mobilize resources and tools for both large-scale and small-scale irrigation 
schemes. 
 
Headline # 5: “Farmer unions strike a deal with Monsanto on sorghum hybrids (2030)” 
States will favor involvement of multinational giants to kick-start the commercial seed sector, 
yet will face powerful counter-powers from dynamic farmers‟ unions requiring lobbying and 
negotiations on both sides. 
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SCENARIO 2 : Long-term priorities with state actors as the dominant force 
 
Des options de gestion intégrée de la fertilité des sols qui doublent les rendements des 
céréales et restaurent les sols. 
La promotion des arbres sur les champs, source d‟argent et de durabilité des systèmes de 
production ; 
La gestion intégrée des ressources au cœur des programmes d‟actions des communes rurales 
40% des producteurs sahéliens utilisent des innovations technologiques pour produire plus 
 
Increased food production or increased food imports, which way forward for West Africa? 
Is food security a priority for west Africa? 
Decline of oil revenues forces governments to embrace agriculture in West Africa  
Agriculture budget in WA to increase by 5%in 2030 says FAO Chief 
Subsidies and the transformation of West African agriculture, which way forward? 
MDG 1 will take another 50 years to achieve? 
 
Investissement des Etats pour le développement du maraîchage 
Investissement des Etats pour le développement de l‟Agroforesterie 
Utilisation des NK dans l‟Agriculture 
Promotion de la petite irrigation 
 
Le Sénégal n‟importe plus de riz 
Les coopératives villageoises exportent les graines d‟arachides ensachés dans la sous région 
Les terres agricoles sont immatriculées et les paysans détiennent des titres fonciers 
Les organisations paysannes créent leurs propres écoles de formation 
Le gouvernement distribue des subventions aux organisations paysannes ayant exporté sur le 
marché européen 
Les paysans sont majoritairement dans le K de la SISMAR et s‟emparent du CA 
 
Politique, de promotion de la transformation des produits agricoles 
Promotion des agro carburants dans les terres dégradées (Jatropha) 
Facilitation de l‟accès du foncier des populations locales  
 
Des mesures de soutien à la production qui permettent au sahel de produire au-delà de ses 
besoins 
La CEDEAO : a partir de 2015, tous les pays investirons 15% de leur budget à l‟Agriculture 
durable 
Emergence d‟agrobusiness men tendant à valoriser les productions locales 
Développement du secteur énergétique pour soutenir l‟irrigation des terres du sahel 
2015, restauration de 40% des terres dégradées de la vallée du Niger (source ABN) 
 
Land degradation by 2015 
State regulation or organizes markets (sub regional) 
The great green wall covers 1000 KM 
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SCENARIO 3: Long-term priorities with non-state actors as the dominant force 
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SCENARIO 4: Short-term priorities with non-state actors as the dominant force 
 
Natural reserve forest sold to Japanese  
The private enterprises will lead and force the state to take decision who arrange private 
productivity 
Due to economic resources sharing only by private leaders, the 10% of the actors will be 
wealthy and 90% very poor 
Land degradation will increase 
Now in Africa, people die for obesity 
Drop of peanut price due to over production  
Drop of school going children which may affect future generation 
Rural exodus because younger will have new need 
Social movement in 2015 for economic growth 
The big revolution will push to new governance due to social crisis 
Climate diseases (malaria, meningitis, etc.;;will increase by 30% in 2030 
ICT will be intensified through telephone farming 
The road will be degraded because the states have not a sustainable programme for that 
Big holding pushes a low for minimum of wage philanthropy 
The poverty will put same actors in fanatic activities (religion, al kaîda…) 
Great degradation of health due to over consumption, stress, and pollution 
Upgrading of criminality due to the need of profit in 2030 
More caterpillars just arrived from china 
Prostitution increased by 10% due to land lost 
 
 
SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
INSTITUTIONAL 
IMPACT 
ECOLOGICAL IMPACT 
Rural exodus increased 
More food, high GDP/capita 
but suburb 
People die for hunger and 
illness 
The private enterprises will 
lead and force the state to 
take decision which arrange 
private productivity 
Land degradation plus 
intensive fertilization 
affected water 
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3. Day 2: structuring the scenarios 
 
The second day began with summarizing the work done so far for a few participants whose 
flights were delayed.  
 
Then, the plan for day 2 was discussed in greater detail, starting with the “time lines” 
exercise. 
 
3.1 Scenario time lines 
 
Once a collection of possible story elements was created, we asked the participants to 
structure and expanded on the scenarios in terms of time and cause and effect. This 
structuring captures the logic of the story – the underlying assumptions that drive events and 
developments in the narrative. This structuring is crucial for future use of the scenarios.  
 
We gave the participants the following terms of reference:  
 
• Structure your story elements on a flipchart: start with those things occurring in 2030 
• Work back to 2011 
• Consider what is required for the current world to move toward the world of your 
scenario 
• To develop a good storyline, there needs to be a sense of causes and effects  
• Place your story events in a chronological order – what causes what?  
• What is missing for one thing to lead to the other?  
• Which events and developments are driven by multiple drivers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Schema showing the generic structure we aimed for in the time lines exercise. 
 
2020 2025 2030 
This is where we start 
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Figure 5 shows the generic structure aimed for in this exercise. There is a specific reasoning 
behind working backward to the present instead of forward. By starting with the end states of 
the scenarios in 2030, the scenarios are not initially limited by sticking to what is expected to 
be business as usual based on the present. This “back-casting” leaves participants relatively 
free to come up with creative, plausible futures but then forces them to track back and think 
about how these futures come about. Often, this means that transitions or other discontinuities 
are needed. The recognition of this fact arises naturally through back-casting.  
 
All groups followed this back-casting approach, though not all groups ended up using the 
specific visual format showing cause and effect links. These links, though implicit in the text, 
are to be made explicit in the follow-up storyline development after the workshop.  
Additionally, not all groups were able to work back to 2011 from 2030 which means that 
their time lines will be extended in the workshop follow-up.  
 
3.2 Time lines – results of scenario groups 
 
Scenario 1: Short-term priorities and state actors dominant 
            
         
2025 2030 
FOOD SECURITY  
Increase in fertilizer use with help of 
subside plus fertilizer production 
Boost in seed supply will help in multi-
nationals…… 
Greater training in products plus 
information plus organization 
Expanded irrigation plus efficiency  
FS increased by 150% (production) 
Supply to regional market 
- Competitiveness networks increase 
- Infrastructures 
- Capacity building roads, energy, 
value change 
DRIVERS 
LIVELIHOODS 
1 
- Diversification of incomes (less 
agriculture dependence)  
- Local process plus value addition  
- Increase agro industries  
- Remittance, micro credits  
2 
- Pharmaceutical production 
increase 
- Sell of national reserves 
- Taking advantage of int/dev. 
Opportunities 
- Women’s development 
 
1 
- Poverty reduced by 50% , meeting 
MDGs 
- Migration, financing policy for 
access to credit 
- Plus 30% agriculture income 
2 
- Improved living condition (human 
welphare) 
- Support for private sector for short 
term governance gains 
- $$$ 
- Politically correct 
ENVIRONMENT  
- Promotion of mixed crop system 
- Provincial water management  
- Intensification of land use 
- Soil and water conservation 
- Market for land increased non Ag 
actors 
- Over exportation – given to  
 
No preserved forests 
- Quick $ plus FS 
- Water use efficiency 
- Water tax, financial gains from 
water technologies 
- GHG decreased  
- GHG increase 
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- Government greed for land- land 
grab 
- Degraded land 
- Market for land, over exportation 
- Poor gov. land policies 
INSTITUTION 
Policy incentives to favour effective 
economic decentralization  
Land taxation system in place 
Effective suppression of customs barriers 
Liberalization of Ag. Information services  
 
- PES markets 
- Land reform completed 
- Regional economic/env/Ag/ safety 
nets policies enforced 
  
 
 
 
Scenario 2: Long-term priorities and state-actors dominant 
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20 
Scenario 3: Long-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
 
 
 
 
Forest cover: the 
hills are green again
2015 2020 2025 2030
Biodiversity: wildlife 
is back
Logging for ag expansion
Integrated agriculture, 
agroforestry
The great green wall
Rehabilitation of hills
Livestock expansion
Community forests
Private sector drives ag intensification and expansion
Tourism + NGOs focus on conservation
NGOS gain in power 
Ecosystem services
Lack of resources
SCENARIO 3: ENVIRONMENTS
Intensification is pollution
Pro-forest governments policies
Negative effect on livestock
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Scenario 4: Short-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
 
 
B – Environment sustainability 
2020 2025 2030 
  Peasant farmers agitate for 
policy to restrict transitional  
Overuse of chemical, 
fertilizer is generalized by 
2020 
25% of land degraded by 
2025 
 
Multinational acquire 30% of 30% of deforestation due to Large companies change 
 
  e co   ni ies 
are se  -
e  o ere      
 n er  ress re 
                                                 
  e  o ern en  
is an  n i  in  
ser an  o    e 
 ri a e sec or an  
   s    s 
Community self-organization 
                                  
 ec no-
 a sannes 
Professionalism (slide 1) 
Private sector land grab 
Women’s ownership (slide 1) 
Non-state actors more 
immediately effective than 
governments – shifts power 
balance in a positive 
feedback loop 
Private sector and 
NGOs/CSOs vie for direct 
influence on governments – 
positive feedback loop 
Need for community 
representation 
Changing social status 
Abandoned by 
government 
Limited by social 
stereotypes 
Benefits and damage for communities from private sector 
development: private sector as service providers, as 
opponents 
Governments demand 
audit NGOs 
Increased information 
about other actors 
Non-state-actors: 
perceptions of competition 
Non-state-actors: 
perceptions of 
collaboration 
Tech adoption (slide 1) 
Communication tech 
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public and private land creation of large scale farms 
and factories 
GHG emissions enhanced 
by20% of the 2011 level 
production systems towards 
green technologies 
For each crops extension, 
40% of agriculture product 
will be due to new land 
clearing 
80% of cultivated areas are 
under erosion (low yield, 
poor,  ores a ion…) 
50 % of cultivated area will 
be acid (ph 3- 4) 
Expansion into drought land 
by rural /local farmers 
Biodiversity loss, water 
pollution and general 
…. e ra a ion 
 
Natural lake disappear  More artificial lake New water barn disease  
 
 
C.     LIVELIHOODS 
2020 2025 2030 
- More income but illes 
distributed creates 
suburbs 
- Violence and drug 
will increase 
 
More arms circulation  
- Increase of resources 
at rural population 
level (30% increasing) 
 
- Some separation of 
family due to 
resources sharing 
issues (40% of 
product unit) 
- Increasing of 
criminality (50% 
more aggressions ) 
 
- Rural exodus 
increased by 40% in 
2020 
- Criminality and 
prostitution increase 
by 30%  
- Rural population 
livelihoods decreased 
by 30% 
- Reduction in 
agriculture 
production and 
alternatives 
livelihoods  
- Increased migration 
of youth for urban 
areas for jobs 
-  
-  
- Rural, urban  
- migration reaches 
40% of the current 
level with exposure 
to ICT 
- ICT technology 
available through ICT 
villages dev. About 
50%  of population 
- 80% of population 
ICT literate hence 
increases 
communication for 
development. 
- The need of great 
productivity favorites 
the multiplication of 
agriculture new 
actors (30%) 
- Livestock and 
agriculture land are 
grabbing by agro 
business men 
- Development of 
news services (by 
20% ) like processing 
in forest product by 
the farmers and rural 
communities 
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3.3 System maps for each scenario 
 
After a start was made with the development of the time lines for each scenario narrative, we 
took time to develop a different, parallel perspective on the scenarios – system maps. These 
system maps chart the key outcomes for each scenario, the key drivers that impact these 
outcomes, and the nature of the relationships between outcomes and drivers. This approach 
allows the participants to chart crucial relationships and feedbacks that make each scenario 
distinct. System maps communicate the scenarios to potential users and make quantification 
based on the assumptions of the workshop participants possible.  
 
This is the assignment given to the participants, including an example (figure 6):  
 
Determine one key OUTCOME each for your scenario for food security, environments and 
livelihoods; 3 outcomes in total. 
Determine two drivers at most for each outcome that are specific to your scenario; 6 drivers 
in total. 
Map the 10 most important relationships between drivers and outcomes and give them a 
positive or negative value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Simple example of a system map containing several outcomes, drivers and 
relationships for food security, environment and livelihoods in West Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOOD 
SUPPLY 
Local 
production 
Imports 
HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
BIODIVERSITY 
STATUS 
- 
Conservation 
movement 
- 
+ 
OUTCOMES 
in capitals, 
Drivers in 
lower case, 
Arrows + signs 
arerelationship 
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3.4 System maps – scenario groups 
 
 
Scenario 1: Short-term priorities and state actors dominant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competiveness
Pro-poor financial 
policies
Water saving 
irrigation 
technologies
Infrastructure
Migration
Water tax
Scenario 1
+
+
++
+
+
+
--
+
-
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Scenario 2: Long-term priorities and state actors dominant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 2
REGIONAL
FOOD SELF-
SUFFICENCY
EMPLOYMENTWATER 
CONSERVATION
Improved ag
technologies
Access to 
markets
Food 
processing
Access to 
credit
Resource 
tenure
Improved ag
mechanisation
Improved 
rural 
infrastructure
= +
= -
red = 2nd order links
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Scenario 3: Long-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
System map for scenario 3
REGIONAL FOOD 
PRODUCTION FOR
REGIONAL CONSUMPTION
BIODIVERSITY
SOCIAL AND KNOWLEDGE 
CAPITAL
Professional
ization of farmers
Women’s ownership 
of land
Technical knowhow
Agricultural land 
expansion
Private ag sector 
agenda
NGO, CSO agenda
+
+
-
+
+
+
-
+
++
++
+
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Scenario 4: Short-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited access to 
productive land
SCENARIO 4
Land 
degradation
Low income
Cash crop
(exportation)
WATER SCARCITY INCREASE AND 
LOST OF BIODIVERSITY BY 30%
Environment sustainability
INCREASE AGITATION FOR 
IMPROVED LIVELIHOOD
Livelihood
20% OF POOR : FOOD 
INSECURE IN 2030
Food security
  
28 
 
Overview of outcomes and drivers for food security, environments and livelihoods 
across the scenarios 
 
 
Food Security Environments Livelihoods Drivers 
 
SCENARIO 1:  State dominates/ Short term priorities 
National food 
security 
increased thru 
importation 
Water use Poverty  Infrastructure 
Competiveness 
Pro-poor financial policies 
Water saving techs 
Water tax 
Migration 
 
SCENARIO 2:  State dominates/ long term priorities 
Regional food 
self sufficiency 
Water 
conservation 
Employment Improved ag technologies 
Competiveness 
Pro-poor financial policies 
Water saving techs 
Water tax 
Migration 
Improved rural infrastructure 
 
SCENARIO 3:  Non - State dominates/ long term priorities 
Regional food 
production for 
regional 
consumption 
Biodiversity Social and 
knowledge 
capital 
Professionalization of farmer 
Private Ag sector agenda 
Ag land expansion 
Tech know-how 
 o ens’ o ners i  o  land 
NGO & CSO agendas 
 
SCENARIO 4: Non - State dominates/ Short term priorities 
Food security 
for poor 
Water 
availability & 
biodiversity 
status 
Improved 
livelihoods 
Land degradation 
Cash cropping for export 
Low incomes 
Limited access to productive land 
Civil disturbance 
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Day 3 Surprises, outcomes of interest and way forward 
 
4.1 Comments on system maps in plenary session 
 
Scenario 1 
 
In this state dominated scenario with short term priorities one could think to promote small 
farmers and develop irrigation.  
 
Scenario 2 
 
The infrastructures are to be developed, the aspects of regional integration are to be 
considered, states regulation on market, enforcement of agreements, the group should also 
focus on food security.  Is there a place for long term green job? 
 
Scenario 3 
 
No comments 
 
Scenario 4 
 
The international impact is to be considered, the demographic change and its impact within 
the region. The scenario is very skeptic 
 
Recommendation: 1.2 billion are suffering food insecurity in the world, these figures should 
be taken into account in this scenario. The demographic is increasing; around 10 % actually. 
Civil society will fight against private sector and that will bring lot of crisis. Finally do not 
forget that even if the state is weak, it will not stay away. 
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4.2 Surprises exercise 
 
A main function of scenarios is to offer plausible yet surprising perspectives on the future. 
History has shown us that low-probability, high-impact events are a major force of change – 
examples that spring to mind are natural disasters or the attacks on the twin towers in New 
York on 9/11. 
 
Scenarios should help us become conscious of this reality of dynamic change, but many 
scenarios exercises have difficulties moving away from predictable, linear trends.  
 
Therefore, in this workshop, we took time to focus explicitly on including surprises in the 
scenario narratives and think about what their effects would be on system developments in 
terms of food security, environments and livelihoods.  
 
We introduced the concept of surprises, and discussed that concrete events like 9/11 and 
natural disasters are not the only forms that surprises can take. 
 
Surprises can be:  
 
• New ideas or insights suddenly becoming dominant: ozone layer, climate change 
• Changes of direction: food prices going up 
• Discrete events: hurricanes, sudden political change (violent or non-violent), shocks 
in oil prices, terrorist attacks 
• Unintended consequences of change: greater accountability in public services 
creates more corruption  
• New phenomena: the internet, mobile phones 
 
We gave the following assignment to the scenario breakout groups: 
 
How would these types of changes and surprises change your story?  Think of at least 2 
different types of surprises for your scenario. 
 
All groups came up with more than 2 different types of surprises. Some groups were able to 
integrate these into their time lines and discuss the consequences, while for some groups this 
step has been left for the story development because of time pressures. 
 
4.3  Surprises per scenario group 
 
SCENARIO 1: Short-term priorities and state actors dominant 
 
Brutal monetary shocks that affect WA‟s competitiveness on international markets 
E g appreciation of cfa franc resulting in decreasing of agriculture exportation, different 
impact on urban / rural food security, income, welphare 
New pesticide, biotic pressures, phyto sanitary crisis (2016) 
Next desiccation event (similar in magnitude to 1970- 1980S) in 2025 
Sudden series of terrorist attacks with religious implications potential failed state (touareg, 
Nigeria?) leading to regional war, guerrilla  
Phytosanitary crisis 
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- Variable impact on FS b/c imports dominant 
- Negative impact on rural poverty/livelihoods 
- Increased national dependence on external solutions (eg arian flu) 
Failed state leading to regional conflict 
- Collapse of local food supply systems 
- Increasing of migration, exodus, increasing of pressure on peaceful islands 
- Destruction, collapse of infrastructures 
- New geopolitical makeup for West Africa (US WA?) 
 
 
SCENARIO 2: Long-term priorities and state actors dominant 
 
2015 20120 2025 2030 
Increase in price of 
oil by 100% 
West Africa spring 
new livestock 
diseases 
Donor funds stop 
and ECOWAS 
becomes stronger 
ECOWAS collapse  
Funds leaving WA 
stops and funds go 
back to WA 
Major tsunami in 
Asian rice producing 
areas water war 
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SCENARIO 3: Long-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 4: Short-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
2015                 2020      2025         2030 
Information/propaganda 
war between 
governments and 
NGOs/CSOs 
Long term drought 
Elections: change of 
guard in multiple 
countries, old leaders 
unwilling to step down 
Libya fails, causes 
economic crash in WA, 
Influx of weapons 
Extreme devaluation of 
currencies 
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• Technology : 2020 N-fixation in maize 
• Economic : 2025 cereal price drop by 20%  
                           International Carbon price increase  
• Environment : 2015/8 three consecutive years of drought 
• Political : 2018 West Africa under single government  
 
 
 
- Demography change in region and other parts of world : ASIA 
- Civil war? 
- Food security focus 
- Conflicts between state and non-state actors 
- Urbanization pressure in rural areas to produce food 
- Migration 
FS 
Regional food (self -sufficiency) production, Food security through imports, Food security 
for poor, Changing food habits, Nutritional value, Media influence,  
ENVIRONMENTS 
Biodiversity, Water availability, Water quality, Land conservation, Air quality, Tree cover  
Fuel use        (land grabbing) 
WELL BEING 
Income, employment, social capital, knowledge capital, Access to physical resources, 
physical, Health, institutional capital, Gender equity  
 
 
4.4 Outcomes of interest and indicators 
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The final session of the workshop consisted of a listing of the key outcomes from the system 
maps exercise across all scenarios. This list was used as a starting point to discuss, in a 
plenary session, what would be a useful first list of outcomes of interest to be explored in all 
the scenarios concerning food security, environments and livelihoods.  
 
In a second session, these outcomes were pasted on the wall across the conference room and 
an open-space session was held where participants walked around and wrote down 
suggestions for indicators and ways to measure each outcome. We chose this method to get as 
much suggestions as possible, as consensus is less important than multiple options for 
measurement to take into consideration. This session was successful and produced a large 
number of suggestions in terms of indicators and ways to measure outcomes. The result is the 
list below.  
 
FOOD SECURITY 
 
NUTRITIONAL VALUE 
 Taux de malnutrition 
 Improved baby food made with local cereals 
 Chemical analyses (protein, carbohydrates, vitamins, Fe, Ca, Zn) 
 Weight for age information in local clinics 
 Ratios of nutriments in diets , energy: protein, Ca, P, etc…. 
 
CHANGING FOOD HABITS 
 Utilisation des légumes à feuilles pour l‟alimentation 
 Manger la viande 3 ou 4 fois par semaine 
 Food processing/  packaging market metrics 
 
REGIONAL SELF SUFFICIENCY  
 Produit disponible/ nombre dela population 
 Production level of major staples 
 Production / importation 
 Taux de couverture des besoins alimentaires 
 % des ménages autosuffisants 
 % des ménages qui bouclent l‟année avec les céréales produits dans leurs 
exploitations 
 Nombre de tonnes exportées 
 Number of cereals banks in rural areas 
 Availability over time 
 
FOOD SAFETY 
 Prix bas des cereals  
 Nombre d‟intoxication 
 Analyser les elements 
 Production and processing standards 
 Contrôle et repression / nombre de verbalisation 
 Réglementation de l‟utilisation des OGM 
 Nombre de laboratoires d‟analyse de qualité 
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 Quality of food 
 Public health records, hepatitis, (starting/aflatoxin prevalence etc 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
AIR QUALITY 
 Monitoring of population 
 Cases of respiration diseases reported 
 Use of solar energy  
 Law of import of user vehicles 
 % des aerosols de l‟air 
 % des maladies respiratoires 
 
LAND CONSERVATION 
 Food availability , power abuse 
 % de terre dégradables 
 Structures ou infrastructures visibles sur le terrain 
 Nombre d‟hectares plantés 
 Effet quantifié des techniques de conservation, nombre de techniques efficientes 
 Chemical, physical analysis (c, no, density, soil, faune) 
 % d‟hectares  de terres restaurées  
 Hectares de terres recuperées 
 Cropland metric under ….. management practice (how very high resolution …) 
 Land use cropping,  grabbing land … 
 Superficies des aires protégées 
 
 
BIODIVERSITY 
 Evaluation de la biomasse par espèce 
 Présence de faune 
 Nombre d‟espèces générées 
 Nombre de variétés (sorgho, mil, maïs, patate, igname) 
 Nombre d‟aires protégées viables  
 Absence de GMOs 
 Conservation, co-habitation 
 Inventory (species names, number of species), inventory of varieties and breeds. 
 Number of seed productions units at the community level 
 Seed self sufficiency 
 
FOREST COVER 
 No fire outbreak reported 
 Availability of a forestry policy and land that is functional 
 GIS ( % of soil cover) 
 Number of ecotourism sites 
 Tree counts/ densities (measured directly from very high res-satellite) 
 Construction d‟une longue bande de la Grande Muraille Verte 
 Evaluation du couvert végétal 
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 Hectares de forêts reboisées 
 Superficies de forêts primaires conservées 
 Taux de couverture végétale 
 
MARINE 
 Inventory (names of species, number of species) 
 
WATER QUANTITY 
 River how ground water depth  
 Water available in underground basins 
 Use of new irrigation technology (drop-irrigation) 
 Water boreholes per the population 
 Management of ground and surface water resources ( strategy, policy, programmes) 
 Water consumption per household   
 Strengthen  …, vegetation greenness metrics…(from satellite) 
 % d‟aménagement hydro agricole 
 Nombre de barrages construits 
 Nombre de techniques de gestion de l‟eau (pluvial, souterraine) 
 
WATER QUALITY 
 Taux d‟accès à l‟eau potable 
 Analyse de l‟eau 
 % d‟infrastructure d‟eau potable 
 Qualité de source d‟eau 
 Availability of functional water laboratories 
 
WATER AVAILABILITY 
 Nombre de ménages ayant accès à l‟eau 
 Nombre de compteurs d‟eau rendus par circonscription urbaine 
 Number of water points per person 
 Number of households with piped water 
 Indice de pauvreté en eau 
 Expositions aux alléas 
 
LIVELIHOODS/WELLBEING 
 
ACCESS TO PHYSICAL RESOURCES  
 Equipment for production and domesticuse 
 Km de réseaux dans les systèmes irrigués 
 Différences de ranchs 
 
SOCIAL 
 Nombre d‟infrastructures sociaux de base dans les zones rurales 
 Différents conflits éleveurs/agriculteurs 
 One family, one bicycle, motor or car 
 Social protection schemes available for the poor 
 Number of schools , hospitals per number of population 
 Access to mobile phone and internet in rural area 
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ECONOMIC 
 Not existing income generation activities for vulnerable groups and individuals 
 Time of income generating awareness 
 Epargne local 
 Montant de crédit octroyé 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 Number of NGOs (survey) 
 Number of communities organizations 
 Dialogue on shared values, culture of tolerance in place 
 Level of organization of rural population  
 % of children in school per family 
 Prise en compte des structures traditionnelles 
 
KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL 
 % of literacy 
 % of secondary education 
 Number of newly diploma (university) 
 New curricula development at universities and schools 
 Number of publications/ speakers in national languages 
 Number and quality of schools 
 Relevance of training program to the wellbeing of individuals/ society 
 % of people/child going to school 
 Réseaux régionaux mis en place 
 Nombres d‟institutions et d‟universités créées 
 Nombre de plateformes de partage de connaissances 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL 
 Criminality level  = performance des actes /décisions 
 Nombres de lois institutionnelles nouvelles 
 State / public officers accountable, wide access to information laws 
 
GENDER EQUITY 
 Effectivity and implementation of laws that promote women, redefinition of access to 
land to enforce women access, existence of mechanism allowing women to combine 
familial issues with working issues 
 Boy / girl child ratio in school 
 Ratio of men and women in policy decision making positions from villages to national 
levels 
 Nombre ou % de femmes ayant accès aux ressources 
 Nombre de femmes aux postes décisionnels 
 
HEALTH 
 % de population souffrant de maladies respiratoires 
 Taux de vaccination 
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 Nombre de centres de santé créés 
 Nombre de médecin par habitant 
 Number of health centre per village 
 Altainment of health related MDGS 
 Height/weight index 
 Nombre d‟enfants malnutris 
 Mosquito prevalence /habitat metrics (from satellite) 
 
INCOME 
 Bank savings 
 Cost of life vs medium salaries 
 MDG1 achieved in 2020 
 What money can buy? 
 % by source (on farm / off farm) 
 Payment received for any job done 
 Salaire mensuel moyen, dépenses moyennes par mois 
 Revenu monétaire par an et par personne active 
 Mesure du panier de  la ménagère, que contient-il ?, à quel prix ? 
 Nombre de femme ayant une activité de production 
 Pauvreté en eau, bords du porte- monnaie 
 Alimentation familiale variée dans la semaine et non riz à midi et pâte le soir 
 
EMPLOYMENT 
 Taux d‟emploi des jeunes 
 Engagement in any income generating venture, measured by number of hours / day 
 Proportion of employees in decent work 
 % des jeunes au chômage au sein d‟une population, part des femmes ayant un emploi, 
activités génératrices de revenue 
 % de jeunes au chômage 
 Proportion of employees enjoying formal social security 
 Rate of people employed per different productive sectors: agriculture, tertiary, …. 
 Number of unemployed youth 
 Number of persons / family working 8 hours per day for pay 
 Number of people in decent work, type of skills in the labour markets 
 % d‟emplois jeunes crées 
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4.5 Collecting contacts for the CCAFS scenarios communication strategy 
 
The last item on the workshop agenda before closing comments and an outline of the way 
forward was a short introduction of the CCAFS scenario communication strategy. 
 
The CCAFS communication strategy on scenarios is based on the principle of linking 
knowledge with action and specifically facilitating policy to action. The communication 
strategy focuses on: 
 
(1) Increasing exposure to the process of developing scenarios in order to build capacity on 
how to conduct regional level scenario exercises,  
 
(2) Building awareness about the various scenarios developed in each region as a decision 
making tool to help decision makers assess plausible future pathways at the regional level and  
 
(3) Awareness of key socio-economic uncertainties and trade-offs between food systems, 
environments and livelihoods at a regional level. 
 
Participants were asked to provide the names of five persons linked to civil society, the 
private sector, donors, research and policy makers and administrators – selecting for those 
people who would be most receptive to the scenarios work and most likely to champion this 
process to third parties.  
 
These names were to be sent to the Regional Scenarios Consultant, Ms. Zenabou Segda. The 
collection of these contacts is still in progress.  
 
Questions for further consideration regarding the CCAFS scenarios communication strategy 
were: 
 
What audience group would you like to target that could benefit from scenarios as a decision 
making tool? Why? 
What communication tools would be useful to target the audience? 
Are there any events in the region where you think scenarios could be used in 2012? 
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4.6 Evaluation of content and process by facilitators and participants 
 
Concerning the results, participants had the following questions:  
 
What are the next steps, how are the scenarios made concrete?  
What types of documents will be created for the communication of the scenarios?   
Are the budget implications for each scenario addressed? 
How will the system maps be presented? 
 
These questions are addressed below in the description of the next steps in the scenarios 
process.  
 
Evaluation by facilitators in terms of results 
 
The facilitators evaluated the results of the different steps taken in the workshop to develop 
content:  
 
Axis revision:  
- to create more clarity ,  
- excellent and improved the scenarios‟ usefulness. 
 
Headlining:   
- creates content through brainstorming; gets the ideas flowing;  Headlines should go 
beyond trends and tell a story. 
- went well and created a lot of content, but some groups expressed these as trends 
rather than headlines. 
Timelines:  
-  provide a structure to the story and align cause and effect, 
-  a bit of confusion over what to describe in 2030, but the historical back stepping went 
well. 
System maps:   
- looks at cause and effect relationships between drivers and outcomes and identifies 
feedbacks, 
- different for each group; was in some cases difficult to reduce system to a few 
essentials; helped some better articulate outcomes and drivers 
OVERALL:  make the scenarios challenging, relevant, plausible and consistent 
 
Evaluation by facilitators in terms of process 
 
A main observation was that as it is natural for people to think about desirable and 
undesirable futures, it is difficult to move beyond this and talk about what could happen 
rather than what we want or do not want to happen. The difference between these two modes 
of futures thinking remained a difficult thing to conceptualize.  
 
It was sometimes difficult to link back to the work of the previous workshop with so many 
new participants – maintaining the balance between work that was already done and revising 
this work in favour of views shaped by a broader group of participants.  
The facilitators though they could have been clearer about what each step leads to – this has 
to be repeated time and time again to maintain a sense of purpose and logic. 
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The group was very engaged throughout the entire process, and group learning could be 
observed in the process. There was an excellent mix of expertise and perspectives that was a 
main success factor in this workshop.  
 
Feedback by participants on the process (on the hand of facilitators) 
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5. Conclusions and next steps in the CCAFS scenarios process for West Africa 
  
The workshop that this document reports on represents a comprehensive, solid basis of the 
CCAFS scenarios development process in West Africa. The revision of key uncertainties, the 
enrichment and structuring of scenario narratives, the identification of key outcomes, drivers 
and relationships in the system maps, the inclusion of surprises and their consequences and 
the mapping of outcomes of interest and possible indicators all provide a basis for the 
development of the scenario narratives and the quantification of the scenarios in terms of 
these outcomes of interest. The involvement of highly engaged experts from across sectors, 
disciplines and countries in West Africa ensures that these scenarios are insightful and 
relevant for these sectors, disciplines and countries in the region. 
 
Story development 
 
From among the participants, scenario writers will create full scenario narratives based on the 
work done in this workshop that explore crucial events and processes in each storyline 
towards an alternate, plausible future in 2030. The scenario writers will take all the outcomes 
of interest into account so that comparability between the scenarios is achieved.  
 
Quantification 
 
The indicators proposed for the outcomes of interest will be reviewed and quantified in 
collaboration with trade, food security and environmental change models and through other 
complementary methods. The next scenarios development workshop will focus on this 
quantification process – how can the scenario narratives be captured in terms of numbers? 
How do assumptions for different outcomes relate to each other? What do the models say 
about the plausibility of different outcomes in a scenario?  This workshop will be done with 
the same, strong and diverse group of participants.  
 
From scenarios development to experimentation with key user groups and wider 
audiences 
 
Scenarios development is a valuable process in itself for group learning and the capturing of 
key features of possible futures and what these mean for our understanding and actions in the 
present. However, much value in scenarios must ultimately come from using and 
experimenting with the scenarios in different contexts of strategy development, research.  
 
As mentioned before, in the CCAFS scenarios process in East Africa which was started 
earlier and serves as the pilot for the process in West Africa the experimentation with the 
scenarios with key user groups is now underway. Plausible future socio-economic and policy 
contexts at a regional level have many applications, from regional-level strategizing to local-
level community adaptations and more specific research and strategy development focusing 
on a single issue (e.g. vector-borne diseases and climate change). 
 
Part of what makes the CCAFS scenarios process unique is that we aim to include this 
experimentation with the scenarios by key user groups into the process. In this, the scenarios 
process becomes less a product and more a service for uncertainty-conscious future 
strategizing across sectors and stakeholder groups.  
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The experimentation with the scenarios by distinct user groups provides a range of 
perspectives on the usefulness of the scenarios and provides different critical perspectives on 
their assumptions. This allows for a reflexive enrichment and revision of the scenarios to 
make them more relevant and flexible in their usefulness. 
 
Apart from the active targeting of and collaboration with key user groups, the CCAFS 
scenarios communication strategy aims for a wide dissemination of the scenarios and the 
insights arising from experimentation with these plausible alternate futures. We do this 
through a collaboration with, among others, the PANOS journalists‟ network for global 
development journalism. Radio, TV, interactive web tools, comics and newspaper articles as 
well as policy briefs and research documents and articles are part of this strategy. 
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ANNEX 1 Scenario breakout groups 
 
Scenario 1 – Short-term priorities and state actors dominant 
 
Ange, Alain Louis, GHANA 
Traore, Pierre Sibiry, MALI 
Parkouda, Sibiri Dominique, BURKINA FASO 
Kouressy, Mamoutou, MALI 
Faye, Mbène Dièye SENEGAL 
Bend, Pauline, SENEGAL 
 Niambele, Aminata Diarra, MALI 
Fatou Faye , SENEGAL 
 
Scenario 2 – Long-term priorities and state actors dominant 
 
Ofei-Nkansa, Kingsley, Ghana 
Bayala, Jules, Mali 
Aubee, Ernest, Nigeria 
Seck, Emmanuel, Senegal 
Faye, Abdourahmane, Senegal 
Kadi Kadi, Hame, Niger 
Senghor, Abdoulaye, Burkina 
 
Scenario 3 – Long-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
 
Diouf, Helene, Senegal 
Sawadogo, Alfred, Burkina Faso 
Moudy Manmane, Sany, Niger 
Karbo, Naaminong, Ghana 
Fahinkey, Mahamadou, the Gambia 
Diop, Mamadou, Senegal 
Coly, Adrien, Senegal 
 
Scenario 4 – Short-term priorities and non-state actors dominant 
 
Ndiaye, Ousmane, Senegal 
Mwickcha, John, Niger 
Sogoba, Bougouna, Mali 
Some, Leopold, Burkina Faso 
Nutsukpo, Delali Kofi, Ghana 
Segda, Zenabou, Burkina Faso 
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ANNEX 2 Comments on objectives linked to outcomes – Alain Ange 
 
For the outcomes exercise, Mr Ange Alain made the following suggestion consisting in 
linking objectives to outcomes. 
Scenario 1 - Government leading – Short term response 
Linking objectives and outcomes – Suggestions from A. ANGE – FARA 
Objectives are designed to provide immediate satisfaction to the public on a case by case 
basis. 
Objectives Increased food 
production 
Increased food 
imports 
Improved livelihoods 
Products from 
policies 
Budget for 
agriculture 
Donor support 
Budget for food 
imports 
International 
support 
More donor support 
and public budget 
 Investments for food 
imports (ports, 
warehouses, etc.) 
 
More farm land Land cession to 
private sector for 
cash crops 
 
More inputs through 
subsidies 
  
More water tapped  Better water access 
Some rural credit  Social nets 
More rural labor is 
mobilized 
  
Better marketing for 
agricultural products 
Industries processing 
production and 
imports 
Improved income 
  Better sanitation 
  Health improvement 
  Education 
Support to 
traditional 
processing 
 Women 
empowerment? 
Outcomes More production More food available  
Social Emergence of 
entrepreneurs in 
farming 
New drive on food 
habits 
Changes in social 
relationships in 
agriculture 
  More benefits for 
private sector 
Fragmentation of 
agricultural land 
  Competition 
between imports 
and national 
production 
Exclusion not 
considered 
 Food prices increase Poverty not reduced 
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  Subsidies on food School children 
targeted 
Natural resources 
management 
Deforestation 
increases 
 Degradation of social 
access to natural 
resource  Land degradation 
increases 
 
 Less water in 
waterways 
 
 Impact on bio-
diversity 
 
 More GHG emissions  Loss of indigenous 
knowledge 
Public finance Taxes on water Taxes on export 
crops 
 
 Taxes on forest 
products 
Taxes on business  
 Budget deficit Budget deficit Lack of budget 
CONCLUSION Increased pressure 
on natural resource 
More dependency to 
international 
markets 
More dependence to 
foreign assistance 
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ANNEX 3 Statement by Ernest Aubee, Principal, Programme officer- Agriculture, ECOWAS 
Commission, Abuja, Nigeria 
Felicitations  
Climate change, Agriculture, foods security  west Africa scenarios workshop seeks to address 
very critical areas of development mainly food security, livelihood, environmental goals in 
the force of changing climate 
Climate change is indeed a practical reality and would hinder the attainment of food 
security and other socio economic targets. The need to work together cannot be over 
emphasized  
I will like to thank CCAFS for supporting the scenario workshop for West Africa. I see this 
workshop not only one of exchange of ideas and experiences but it is one of capacity 
building. The issues of climate change are dynamic and complex, we need to build a critical 
ways of expertise in West Africa. 
I will like to thank CCAFS for supporting CORAF, one of the technical partners of the 
ECOWAS Commission. I am confident that the CCAFS/ CORAF partnership will yield positive 
developments for West Africa. The challenges of climate change cannot be addressed in an 
ad-hoc basis. We need to have a holistic and comprehensive strategy and activities to 
address climate change. I am delighted to see that the scenario building workshop will 
compliment what the ECOWAS Commission is doing in the areas of agriculture, food 
security, climate change and livelihood enhancement. 
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ANNEX 4 :   Mot de bienvenue du CORAF/WECARD 
 
Mr le représentant de la CEDEAO 
 
Mesdames et  Messieurs les représentants des institutions nationales, sous régionales, 
régionales et internationales  
 
Chers participants  
Honorables invités 
Mesdames et Messieurs 
 
Je commencerai mes propos par présenter les excuses de Dr Paco Sérémé Directeur Exécutif  
du CORAF/W ECARD absent de cette cérémonie pour mission en dehors du Sénégal 
Et je souhaite donc en en son nom la bienvenue à tous les participants qui ont bien voulu 
e  ec  er  e  é  ace en   o r  ar ici er à ce  e rencon re  ’ n  rès  ran  in érê  à  o   
point de vue. 
Je n’ai cer es  as  esoin  e  o s  ire q e,  e  irec e r  xéc  i         F       , 
reconnai   o  e  ’i  or ance de cet atelier qui est le 2ème  ’ ne série q i a  é arré  ar 
 ’or anisa ion  ’ n a e ier ré iona  s r « e   an e en    i a iq e,  ’  ric    re e   a 
 éc ri é   i en aire en   riq e  e  ’  es   en  à  akar a   éné a      8 a      e  e  re 
2010. Rencontre  ar ai  e rs coor onnée  ar  e     F        a ec  ’i   ica ion  e son 
programme sur la gestion des ressources naturelles qui coordonne un large volet sur les 
changements climatiques. 
 
Ce processus créatif qui se poursuit avec les différents acteurs de la politique, du secteur 
privé, de recherche, ONG, médias et organisations de la société civile bénéficiera non 
se  e en   e  ’a   i  ais  e  a  ar ici a ion        F        à  o s  es ni ea x     e  
partenariat déjà tissé entre notre institution et le programme CCASA. 
 
 ans  ’es oir   e réa iser  es  rinci a x rés   a s a  en  s  e ce  a e ier q i res en   ar 
ailleurs un excellent moyen de créer et de développer des connections entres acteurs mais 
a ssi  ’i en i ier  es in érê s co   ns e   es i ées  e co  a oration, je souhaite au nom du 
Directeur Exécutif du CORAF/WECARD plein succès aux travaux qui seront menés au cours 
de ces trois jours.  
 
Je vous remercie.  
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ANNEX 5 : RECOMMANDATIONS POUR LE RAPPORT ATELIER CCAFS D’ALAIN ANGE 
 
Sommes- nous vraiment dépendants des OGM pour améliorer la productivité ? 
( ’a é iora ion  éné iq e a ac  e  e en   ea co    e so   ions q i ne son   as  a orisées ; 
 
   es   a x  e  ire q e  ’a   en a ion  e  ’  i isa ion  es en rais  a con  ire à co r   er e à 
des pollutions. La consommation moyenne actuelle est de 6kg /ha de NPK ; i  n’  a pas de 
pertes  significatives à moins de de 50 kg/ha ; 
 
Par con re,  ’a  s e   es  a  ais  sa es  es  es ici es son   n  rai  an er ( o    ion, 
noci i é  o r  ’a i en a ion, résis ance  es ra a e rs,  éséq i i res éco o iq es…) ; 
 
Pour développer les scénarios proposés, il faut faire apparaître les rapports de force et les 
contradictions qui résultent des choix ; 
 
 n   riq e  e  ’  es , i  con ien rai   e  is in  er  es scénarios  our les pays côtiers, 
sensibles aux marchés internationaux et mieux pourvus en ressources (destination des 
migrations) et les pays enclavés moins soumis à la globalisation des marchés et avec moins 
de ressources (zones de départ des migrations) ; 
 
Les scénarios doivent considérer les mécanismes qui les financent ; 
 
Il faut distinguer les produits (décisions, régulations, modes de financement) et les effets 
des scénarios (services aux populations, économie, environnement) ; 
 
Les mots ont un poids important pour décrire les composantes essentielles des scénarios. 
Exemples 
 
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 
- Fournir des aliments -  ss rer  ’a  os   isance 
alimentaire 
- Usa e  e  ’ea  -  onser a ion  e  ’ea  
- Réduire la pauvreté - Pro o  oir  ’e   oi  
- Financer les déficits générés par 
les actions de subvention 
- Organiser le financement des 
budgets publics 
- Action nationale - Concertation régionale  
 
Quatre titres proposés pour les scénarios 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Le feu à la maison 
SCENARIO 2 
Action publique organisée  
SCENARIO 4 
Prends et débrouilles toi 
SCENARIO 3 
Programmation et régulation concertées 
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ANNEX 6 : KEY WORDS TRANSLATED 
 
Key terms Short explanation Translation 
   
  Uncertainty When something is 
inderminate or indefinite 
and we don't know 
enough about it. 
Uncertainty might be 
measurable in which 
case we know both the 
type of uncertainty and 
the amount of 
uncertainty; 
unmeasurable in which 
case we know about the 
uncertainty but not how 
uncertain it is; and 
unknown, in which we 
are not aware of the 
uncertainty.  
Incertitude Situation indéterminée 
ou indéfinie et sur 
laquelle nous ne 
disposons pas d'assez 
de connaissances. Une 
incertitude peut être 
mesurable : dans ce cas, 
nous connaissons à la 
fois le type et le degré 
d'incertitude. Elle peut 
aussi être non 
mesurable : dans ce cas, 
nous la connaissons 
mais nous en ignorons 
le dégré. Elle peut enfin 
être inconnue : dans ce 
cas, nous ignorons 
l'incertitude.   
Scenarios Alternate futures 
described in words 
and/or numbers that 
explore how the future 
could develop without 
making predictions. 
Scenarios Description en mots 
et/ou en chiffres de 
futurs alternatifs, 
présentant le 
déroulement éventuel 
de l'avenir, en veillant à 
ne pas faire de 
prévision   
Scenario stories Stories describing 
different alternate 
futures. 
Recits/descriptifs de scenarios Récits décrivant 
différents futurs 
alternatifs 
Vision A decription of a desired 
future.  
Vision Description d'un futur 
souhaité 
Scenario time 
lines 
Using time to structure 
how a scenario develops 
- what changes lead to 
other changes over a 
time period.  
Calendrier/echeancier/deroulement 
d'un scenario 
Structuration 
chronologique d'un 
scénario, chaque 
changement générant 
d'autres changements 
sur une période 
donnée. 
System map A drawing  describing 
how different elements 
in a system ( such as a 
food system, social 
system, environmental 
system) relate to each 
other. 
Carte de systeme Dessin décrivant les 
relations qui existent 
entre les différents 
éléments d'un système 
(par exemple, le 
système alimentaire, le 
système social, le 
système 
environnemental)  
Quantification The process of adding 
numbers to stories, using 
models and other 
methods. 
Quantification 
Chiffrage des récits à 
l'aide de modèles et 
autres méthodes  
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Outcomes The consequences of 
alternative futures that 
the workshop group is 
interested in. 
Resultats/consequences/effets Conséquences des 
futurs alternatifs qui 
intéressent les 
participants à l'atelier 
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ANNEX 7 : Programme 
 
TIME/HORAIRES ACTIVITY/ACTIVITE SPEAKER/FACILITATEUR 
DAY1 : 01 November 2011 
17.00 – 21.00 Arrival and registration 
Arrivée et enregistrement des participants 
DAY2: 02 November2011 
09.00 Welcome words 
Mots de Bienvenue 
CORAF 
09.30 Introduction to the scenarios process for 
West Africa , questions 
Présentation du processus de scenario en 
Afrique de l’Ouest, Questions 
John Ingram, Robert Zougmoré, 
Polly Ericksen, Joost Vervoort 
10.30  Coffe and speed meet/Pause café et echanges  
11.00 Discuss key uncertainties 
Discussion sur les incertitudes importantes. 
. 
Joost Vervoort 
12.00 Discuss challenges for each scenario 
Discussion sur les défis pour chaque scenario 
12:30 Lunch/ Déjeuner 
13.30 Challenges continued, developing the stories: 
headlines technique (breakout groups)  
Joost Vervoort 
15.00  Coffe and speed meet/ Pause café et echanges  
 15.30 Presenting first results, feedback 
Présentation des premiers résultats, réactions 
John Ingram 
16.00- Further story development  
Développement d’autres récits  
Joost Vervoort, 
17.00 Recap, end of day /Résumé de la journée, Fin Robert Zougmore 
DAY3 :03 November 2011 
09.00 Recap of previous day, way forward  
Récapitulatif de la veille, marche à suivre  
Joost Vervoort 
09.30 Developing the stories – time lines (breakout groups) 
10.30 Coffee and speed meet /Pause café et echanges  
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10.00 Short intro on surprises  
Petite introduction sur les surprises   
Joost Vervoort 
10:15 Developing the stories –surprises in the time 
lines (breakout groups) 
 
12:00 Presenting results in the plenary  
Présentation des résultats en plénière   
Joost Vervoort 
12.30  Lunch/Déjeuner 
13.30 Par ici an s’  ers ec i es on na  ra  an  
social systems  
Les perspectives des participants sur les 
systèmes sociaux et naturels  
Joost Vervoort 
 
14.30 System maps /Cartes de systèmes  Joost Vervoort 
15.00  Coffee and speed meet/Pause café et echanges  
15.30 Developing system maps (breakout groups) 
Elaboration des cartes de systèmes (travaux en groupes) 
17.30 Recap, end of the day/ Résumé de la journée 
et Fin 
Joost Vervoort and Robert 
Zougmore 
DAY 4:04 November 2011 
09.00   Recap and way forward  
Récapitulatif de la veille et marche à suivre 
Joost Vervoort 
 
09:30  Comparing the system maps, coming to 
overall outcomes of interest  
Comparaison des cartes systèmes, pour 
aboutir à des résultats intéressants  
Joost Vervoort, Polly Ericksen 
 
10.30  Coffee and speed meet/ Pause café et echanges  
11.00  Comparing the system maps, coming to 
overall outcomes of interest  
Comparaison des cartes systèmes, pour 
aboutir à des résultats intéressants 
Joost Vervoort, Polly Ericksen 
12.00  Lunch/ Déjeuner 
13:00 
 
Open space brainstorm– determining ways to 
measure for the outcomes of interest 
Brainstorming pour explorer les possibilités de 
mesures des résultats d’intérêt.  
 
14.00 
 
Open space brainstorm with PANOS journalist 
network: communicating scenarios 
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Brainstorming avec les journalistes du réseau 
PANOS : la communication autour des 
scenarios 
15:00  Workshop recap and way forward 
Récapitulatif de l’atelier et marche à suivre  
John Ingram, Robert Zougmore, 
Joost Vervoort 
15.30   End of workshop / Clôture de l’atelier  
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ANNEXE 8 : List of participants 
 
N° Name Title & Organization Address Telephone Email 
1 ANGE Alain Louis 
 Technical Advisor to Forum 
for Agricultural Research in 
Africa (FARA) 
N° 12 Anmeda Street, 
Roman Ridge PMB CT 
173 Cantonments Accra - 
GHANA 
(233) 302772823  
(233) 543287898 
aange@fara-africa.org  
2 AUBEE Ernest 
Principal Programme Officer 
, Agriculture- 
ECOWAS Commission 
Abuja, NIGERIA (234) 806 28 63719 aubee2008@yahoo.com  
3 BAYALA Jules 
Ecophysiology/Agroforestry 
World Agroforestry Centre, 
ICRAF WAC - Sahel Node 
 BP E5118 Bamako- 
MALI 
(223) 20235000      
(223) 77714190 
J.Bayala@cgiar.org  
4 BEND Pauline PANOS INSTITUTE Dakar, SENEGAL (221) 33 869 16 66 pbend@panos-ao.org  
5 
CHAUDHURY 
Moushumi 
Social Scientist CGIAR 
Research Programme on 
Climate Change, Agriculture 
and Food Security 
World Agroforestry 
Center (ICRAF) PO Box 
30677-00100 Nairobi  
KENYA 
(254) 207224312 M.Chaudhury@cgiar.org  
6 COLY Adrien Leader Project CLUVA 
Maison de l'Université 
B11 Saint Louis, 
SENEGAL 
(221) 77 569 12 45 adrien.coly@gmail.com  
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7 DAN Vincent Conference interpreter Dakar, SENEGAL (221) 77 1838436 danvince@gmail.com  
8 DIAGNE Serigne Conference interpreter Dakar, SENEGAL (221) 77 644 36 37  serdiagne@yahoo.com  
9 
DIARRA Niambelé 
Aminata 
Direction Nationale de 
l'Agriculture du Mali (Afrique 
de l'Ouest) 
Bamako, MALI   mineyitou@yahoo.fr  
10 DIOP Helène Diouf  
Coordonnatrice ASFED 
(Association Sénégalaise 
des Femmes pour l'Entraide 
et le Développement) - 
Membre APROVAL 
Nord Foire Azur,Dakar, 
SENEGAL 
(221) 77 558 05 43 
lnamdiouf@yahoo.fr 
Asfed2002@yahoo.fr  
11 DIOP Mamadou 
Coordonnateur National 
PROGEBE Sénégal  
Quartier Saré Moussa        
BP 447 Kolda, 
SENEGAL 
(221) 776362011    
(221) 339388028 
mamadou.diop@progebe.sn    
mamadoudiop@refer.sn 
12 
Ekpé Kodjo 
AFESEY Delight 
Conference interpreter Dakar, SENEGAL (221) 775740452 delafes@gmail.com  
13 ERICKSEN Polly Senior Scientist, ILRI  
PO Box 30709, Nairobi,  
KENYA  
(254) 2042238855 p.ericksen@cgiar.org  
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14 FAYE Abdourahmane 
Chef du BFPA du Ministère 
de l'Agriculture 
Sacré Cœur 3 derrière 
Boulangerie jaune BP 
5940 Dakar, Fann - 
SENEGAL 
(221) 77 5297687 
rahfaye@yahoo.fr  
rahfaye@gmail.com 
15 FAYE Mbène Dièye  
Manager, Policy, Markets 
and Trade Programme- 
CORAF/WECARD 
7, Avenue Bourguiba                                   
BP 48 Dakar RP - 
SENEGAL 
(221) 33 869 96 18 mbene.faye@coraf.org  
16 FAYE Ndèye Fatou 
Chargée de Projet ENDA 
Tiers Monde - Enda Energy 
Dakar, SENEGAL   ndeyefatoufaye@yahoo.fr  
17 
FAYINKEH 
Mahamadou 
Président de la Plateforme  
(NACOFAG) 
Banjul, THE GAMBIA 
(220) 9954251    
(220) 7005942 
mfayinkeh@yahoo.com  
18 HANE Libasse PANOS INSTITUTE Dakar, SENEGAL (221) 33 869 16 66 lhane@panos-ao.org  
19 INGRAM John 
NERC Food Security Leader 
University of Oxford - U.K. 
Ennvironmental Change 
Institute (ECI), Oxford 
University Centre for the 
Environment South Parks 
Road, Oxford OXI3QY - 
U.K. 
(44)1865585175 john.ingram@eci.ox.ac.uk  
  
59 
20 
KADI KADI Hame 
Abdou 
Scientist - Institut de 
Recherche Agronomiques 
du Niger (INRAN) 
BP 429 Niamey - NIGER (227) 90 36 08 97 hkkadi@gmail.com  
21 KARBO Naaminong  
Director - CSIR-Animal 
Research Institute (CSIR-
ARI) 
P.O. Box M.32 - Accra 
GHANA 
(233) 21 912 179             
(233) 208 129 300 
minongkordam@yahoo.com 
22 
KOURESSY 
Mamoutou 
 Chef d'Unité 
Agroclimatologue du 
Laboratoire Sol Eau Plante 
de l'IER/Sotuba  
CRRA de Sotuba BP 262  
Bamako - MALI 
(223) 66 78 34 43 nanym63@gmail.com  
23 LO Ndeye Khady 
Communication Assistant - 
CORAF/WECARD 
7, Avenue Bourguiba                                   
BP 48 Dakar RP - 
SENEGAL 
(221) 33 869 96 18 
  
24 
MOUDY MAMANE 
Sani 
Conseiller Technique du 
Ministre de l'Agriculture du 
Niger 
BP 11921 Niamey, 
NIGER 
(227) 96 98 08 26   
(227) 91 05 42 90   
(227) 20 73 35 41 
moudymamanesani@yahoo.fr  
25 MULLER Bertrand 
CIRAD - AfricaRice-ISRA-
CERAAS 
Thies - SENEGAL (221) 775071731 bertrand.muller@cirad.fr  
26 MWIKYA John 
Chief, Climate and 
Environment Department 
ACMAD 
85, Avenue des 
Ministères   BP 13184 
Niamey - NIGER 
(227) 20734992 johnmwicha@yahoo.com  
  
60 
27 NDIAYE Cécile Edith 
Bilingual Assistant 
CORAF/WECARD 
7, Avenue Bourguiba                                   
BP 48 Dakar RP - 
SENEGAL 
(221) 33 869 96 18 cecile.ndiaye@coraf.org  
28 NDIAYE Ousmane 
Service National de la 
Météorologie (ANAMS) 
BP 8257 Aéroport LSS, 
Dakar, SENEGAL 
(221) 33 869 53 39 
(ext 4414) / 
779747541 
ousmane@iri.columbia.edu  
29 
NUTSUKPO Delali 
Kofi 
Deputy Director 
(Environment and Land 
Management) Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture 
Directorate of Crops 
Services PO Box M37 
Accra - GHANA 
(233) 302687213   
(233) 208585885 
kofi_nutsukpo@live.com  
30 
OFEI-NKANSAH 
Kingsley 
General Secretary, General 
Agricultural Workers' Union  
Hall of Trade Unions, 
P.O.BOX 701 Accra, 
GHANA 
(233) 302 665514 
(233) 24 2901538 
kingsley_on@yahoo.co.uk  
gawughanatuc@yahoo,com  
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Conference interpreter Dakar, SENEGAL (221) 77556 47 26 herman_ov@yahoo.fr  
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BURKINA FASO 
(226) 50 31 84 61   
(226) 70 26 52 53  
psibridv@yahoo.fr  
33 SAWADOGO Alfred 
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Sahel International Burkina 
Faso Président de la 
Coalition des OSC sur le 
changement climatique au 
Burkina Faso 
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Ouagadougou, 
BURKINA FASO 
(226) 70 78 27 17      
(226) 50 38 39 92 
sawadogoyambangba@yahoo.fr  
  
61 
34 SECK Emmanuel 
Coordonnateur de 
Programmes, ENDA  Tiers 
Monde Programme Energie 
Environnement 
Développement 
54, Rue Carnot Dakar, 
SENEGAL 
(221) 338222496 
ssombel@yahoo.fr 
enda.energy@orange.sn  
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